Is There a Heat or Eat Trade-off in the UK? by Timothy K.M. Beatty et al.
KOÇ UNIVERSITY-TÜSİAD ECONOMIC RESEARCH FORUM  














IS THERE A HEAT OR EAT TRADE-OFF IN THE UK?  
 
 
Timothy K.M. Beatty 
Laura Blow 








Working Paper 1133 













KOÇ UNIVERSITY-TÜSİAD ECONOMIC RESEARCH FORUM  
Rumelifeneri Yolu 34450 Sarıyer/Istanbul Is There a ￿Heat or Eat￿ Trade-o￿ in the UK?
Timothy K.M. Beatty
University of Minnesota
Institute for Fiscal Studies
Laura Blow
Institute for Fiscal Stuides
Thomas F. Crossley
Koc University
Institute for Fiscal Studies
University of Cambridge
Abstract
We merge detailed household level expenditure data from older households with historical local weather information.
We then test for a heat or eat trade o￿: do households cut back on food spending to ￿nance the additional cost of
keeping warm during cold shocks? For households who cannot smooth consumption over time, cold weather shocks
are equivalent to income shocks. We ￿nd evidence that the poorest of older households are unable to smooth spending
over the worst temperature shocks. Statistically signi￿cant reductions in food spending are observed in response to
winter temperatures two or more standard deviations colder than expected (which occur about one winter month in
forty) and reductions in food expenditure are considerably larger in poorer households.
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1 Introduction
In recent winters, media outlets reported that unseasonable weather and rising energy costs forced elderly
households in the United Kingdom to choose between ￿heating and eating￿. 123 In other words, households
were said to be forgoing food to pay for the increased cost of staying warm. In this paper, we study the
empirical evidence for a ￿heat or eat￿ trade-o￿ in the United Kingdom. We show analytically how, for some
households, cold weather shocks can translate into adverse income shocks. We then ask whether, empirically,
there are households who are unable to smooth these relatively small shocks, and whether these shocks are
large enough that these households must reduce expenditures on other essentials, notably food. We model
temperature shocks using historical regional weather data and then merge our estimated temperature shocks
with UK household expenditure data in order to study older households’ response to unusual temperatures.
This research is timely given the recent period of record energy prices, the possibility of future increases in
energy prices, and the current pressure on public ￿nances that may lead to reduced support for vulnerable
households.
Cold weather can have serious health consequences. On average, the UK experiences thirty thousand
￿excess deaths￿ each winter, with older people most at risk (Department of Health, 2009). 4 The epidemiology
literature documents a strong correlation between outside temperature and the mortality rate (Curwen
(1997), Wilkinson et al (2001), Keatinge (2002)). It also makes clear that the causal link is complicated,
with debate about whether it is exposure to colder outdoor temperatures or to lower indoor temperatures
that poses the greater risk (Keatinge (1986), Eurowinter (1997), Keatinge and Donaldson (2001), Keatinge
et al., (2004)). However, there is evidence that indoor temperatures matter, and Wilkinson et al (2001)
concluded that ￿substantial winter-summer di￿erence in mortality is indeed related to indoor temperature
and to dwelling characteristics that are determinants of indoor temperature￿. Interestingly though, this and
other studies (eg., Wilkinson et al (2004), Lawlor et al, (2000), Maheswarana et al (2004)) ￿nd no signi￿cant
e￿ect of socio-economic status on the likelihood of a winter death (relative to any other time of year).
However, this ￿nding does not rule out ￿heat or eat￿ tradeo￿s. It could be that, while richer households can
smooth the increased costs over a longer stretch of time, some poorer households have to go without other
essentials in order to pay for the increased cost of staying warm. Such cutbacks, if they do occur, will have
important welfare consequences (in terms of utility and perhaps long-run health) even if they do not show




4 The O￿ce of National Statistics de￿nes excess winter mortality as ￿Excess winter mortality is calculated as winter deaths
(deaths occurring in December to March) minus the average of non-winter deaths (April to July of the current year and August
to November of the previous year).￿2 The Economics of Cold Weather Shocks 3
There is a literature in development economics that studies the ability of rural households to smooth
weather shocks (Paxson, 1992); weather shocks a￿ect income through agricultural productivity. In a devel-
oped country context, this mechanism is less important. Instead, we show how cold weather shocks can be
thought of as increasing the e￿ective price of a given internal temperature; these price changes will have
income e￿ects for households that are unable to smooth spending over time. We formalise this idea below.
Among households for whom home heating represents a signi￿cant fraction of the household budget, the
negative income e￿ect of an increase in the price of internal temperature is potentially large. Whether some
households are unable to smooth such shocks ￿even in the presence of capital markets and social safety nets￿
is an empirical question.
There is recent evidence from the United States that low-income households do trade o￿ between food
and staying warm during unseasonably cold weather (Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Cullen et al. (2005)).
The authors ￿nd that both poorer and richer households in America increase fuel expenditure in response to
unusually cold weather, and that low-income households simultaneously decrease food expenditure whereas
richer households do not. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) also ￿nd a link between spending and nutritional
outcomes in US data. We improve on the methodology of the previous literature in a number of ways ￿
notably by allowing for nonlinear e￿ects of temperature shocks￿ and provide the ￿rst evidence on this issue
for the UK.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a model of how consumers
respond to cold weather shocks; this analysis informs our subsequent empirical work. Section 3 describes the
data and methods we use in our empirical analysis and Section 4 present our results. Section 5 concludes
with a discussion of our ￿ndings.
2 The Economics of Cold Weather Shocks
We ￿rst set out a simple theoretical model of the e￿ects of cold weather shocks on households. We consider
two polar cases: households who can smooth consumption over time and those who, without access to credit
or savings, solve a static problem. Of course, most actual households will lie somewhere between these polar
cases. In general, smoothing of any type of shock will be more di￿cult if access to credit is limited; if time
horizon is short (as in old age); or if the shocks in question are very persistent.
Suppose utility is de￿ned over ambient temperature (h), food (f), and other goods (x): U(f;h;x). Sup-
pose further that the amount of fuel z required to maintain ambient temperature h given outside temperature
t is give by some function: Z(h;t); Zh > 0; Zt < 0. We ￿rst consider consumers who can borrow and lend





subject to the intertemporal budget constraint














lt+s = Elt+s+1 (4)
Equation 4 is the familiar condition describing optimal intertemporal asset allocation which prescribes
that the consumer holds her marginal utility of wealth constant across periods, at least in expectation.
The consumer’s intratemporal decision regarding allocation between food and heat is given by rearranging





Equations (1), (2) and (3) link the consumer’s intertemporal and intratemporal allocation decisions; their






















Looking at the MRS condition (equation 5), if we, reasonably, assume that Zht(ht+s;tt+s) < 0 then a
decrease in outside temperature is like an increase in the price of heating. For consumers that can smooth
transient shocks (hold  constant), the only e￿ect of a temperature shock is through the change in relative
prices. This e￿ect is captured by the own- and cross-price Frisch elasticities. Note that if food and heat
are Frisch-substitutes (e.g. a warm bowl of soup substitutes for indoor heat) the e￿ect will be in the
opposite direction to the ￿heat or eat￿ trade-o￿: the increased price of indoor heat associated with low
outdoor temperatures will induce consumers to substitute towards food (and away from fuel), increasing
food expenditures. Of course, if substitution possibilities between indoor heat and food are limited, this
e￿ect will be unimportant.
Now consider consumers who cannot smooth and face a within period budget constraint of:
pzz + pff  m
(where we have dropped the time subscripts for simplicity). For ease of exposition, suppose that Z(h;t) is
homogeneous of degree one in h. Then we can write:
pzz = pzZh(h;t)h  phh
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(7)2 The Economics of Cold Weather Shocks 6
where wh is the budget share of heat, which equals the budget share of fuel, wz, since pzz = phh: Combining












If cold weather increases the ￿price￿ of ambient heat (Zht(h;t) < 0), then
dlog Zh(h;t)
dlog t < 0 and a decrease
in temperature renders the term outside the brackets in (8) positive. The ￿rst term inside the brackets is
the substitution e￿ect. The second term is the income e￿ect of the ￿price￿ change, and this is the term that
is not present for consumers who are fully able to smooth over time. This income e￿ect is larger for poorer
households because they have a higher fuel budget share. It also depends on the income elasticity of food.
Finally, if heat is truly essential (at an ambient temperature of  h) so that it responds neither to income nor
price, the ￿price￿ (temperature) shock becomes just a disposable income shock. The within period constraint
is just then:









In sum, temperature shocks change the price of indoor temperature. Households will face a heat or eat
trade-o￿ if they are unable to hold the marginal utility of money constant, so that these price shocks have
income e￿ects. This is more likely to be true among poorer (as they will be less able to use saving and credit
to smooth) and older households (as they have a shorter time horizon). The income e￿ect will be larger the
higher the budget share of fuel; as fuel is a necessity, this again points to poorer households. Multiplying
the income e￿ect by the income elasticity of food gives the e￿ect on food demand.
Note that we follow the literature in focussing on food expenditures. However, Browning and Crossley
(2009) emphasize that food does not a￿ord the most sensitive test of households’ ability to smooth, both
because of its low income elasticity and because households can mitigate the welfare costs of a shock by
delaying the replacement of durable goods, so that purchases food should preferentially smoothed. The
corrolary of this point though, is that failures to smooth that show up in food expenditure are likely to
be associated with important welfare losses. More generally, food is of particular interest, because it is a
necessity and because of the connection through nutrition to health. It is worth noting that the theory
sketched here does not imply that positive and negative temperature shocks have symmetric e￿ects on food
expenditures. Neither the function Zh(h;t) (that maps temperatures in the price of indoor heat), nor the
food Engel curve (that maps income e￿ects into food expenditures) need be linear, and in general they will3 Data and Methods 7
not be.
Finally, the theoretical perspective above, this paper also addresses the more general question of how
unexpected changes in the price of a necessity can translate into an income shock. On this question, Givecha,
Hastings and Villas-Boas (2010) ￿nd some evidence that changes in petrol prices induce statistically signi￿-
cant changes in food spending in the United States.
3 Data and Methods
We measure spending on food and on fuel using the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) and the earlier
Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 5. The FES/EFS contains detailed information on household expenditure
patterns from an annual nationally representative sample of around 7,000 households, who are asked to keep
a two-week expenditure diary, as well as information on more infrequent purchases over longer time horizons,
household structure, geographic location, and income. Data from the FES/EFS is available from 1968; for
reasons of consistency in the information available, we study data from 1974 through to 2007. We focus
on households with at least one member aged 60 or over; 80,966 such households are observed in the data.
Households from all standard regions are present in the sample each month. 6
The e￿ects of unanticipated cold weather are likely to di￿er over the course of a year ￿ a winter shock
is presumably more important than a summer shock ￿ and between households, as the theory sketched in
the previous section suggests that poorer households are less able to respond to temperature shocks than
better o￿-households. To this end, we study four subsets of our population of interest: 1. All households
2. All households observed during the winter months (November, December, January and February) 3. The
poorest quarter of households in the bottom quartile of the expenditure distribution 4. The poorest quarter
of households in the bottom quartile of the expenditure distribution, observed during the winter months.
We de￿ne a￿uence in terms of total spending as recent research suggests that living standards are better
measured by spending than income, particularly for poor households (Meyer and Sullivan, 2003 and Brewer
et al., 2006).
Currently, the UK government makes a Cold Weather Payment (of 25 pounds) to eligible households
for for each seven day period of very cold weather between 1 November and 31 March. A period of very
cold weather is de￿ned as one in which the local average temperature is forecast or recorded to be below
0 degrees celsius for 7 consecutive days. Eligible households are those receiving pension credit, and some
households that receive income support or income-based job-seekers’ allowance, notably those with a young
5 From 2008, this survey has been known as the Living Costs and Food Survey.
6 The sampling design for the FES/EFS is a multi-stage strati￿ed random sample with clustering. It is drawn from the Small
Users ￿le of the Postcode Address File - the Post O￿ce’s list of addresses. Postal sectors (ward size) are the primary sample
unit. 672 postal sectors are randomly selected during the year after being arranged in strata de￿ned by standard regions.3 Data and Methods 8
or disabled child. Thus some households in our sample received this payment. Most of the households in our
sample received the separate Winter Fuel Payment, which is actually an unconditional cash transfer paid
each November or December to households in which one member is 60 years or older. 7
Before turning to the relationship between unseasonably cold weather and fuel and food expenditures,
we ￿rst document patterns of spending on fuel among older UK households. We consider both how much
households spend on heating fuel, and how they pay for fuel. If households have an ongoing arrangement with
a provider by which they make equal payments each month (an installment plan), then a spell of unseasonably
cold weather does not generate a contemporaneous expense. On the other hand, households with ￿pay as you
go￿ arrangements (such as payment cards or slot meters), unseasonably cold weather generates an expense
that must be met immediately. For each of the groups de￿ned above we look at the mean share and the
90th percentile of total expenditure spent on food and fuel over several recent survey years, as well as the
the fraction of households paying for heating in di￿erent means (￿pay as you go￿, retrospective payment on
account and equal installment plans).
Spending on fuel includes gas and electricity payments, coal, coke, and bottled gas and coke for central
heating. Clearly some electricity and gas use may have been for cooking, lighting etc and not heating, but it
is not possible to separate this out. Spending on food is all expenditure on food and non-alcoholic drink for
consumption at home, although results are very similar when we include spending on food consumed away
from home.
We measure temperatures using publicly available Met O￿ce 8 data and calculate monthly averages from
di￿erent U.K. regions. Our focus is the e￿ects of an unexpected increase in heating costs associated with
unseasonable weather, rather than routine seasonal variation. For example, if households routinely spend
more on food in winter simply because some items (e.g. fresh fruit) are seasonally more expensive, then that
is not an e￿ect that we would wish to include in our evaluation.
In order to isolate unexpected weather events, we must ￿rst model expected temperatures. We use
linear regression to decompose observed temperatures into a regional component (capturing geographic
di￿erences), a monthly component (capturing normal seasonal variation) and a quadratic time trend (to
capture long-run changes in weather over the period 1974-2007). A temperature shock is then de￿ned as
the residual from this regression (that is, the di￿erence between the predicted temperature and the realized
temperature). We construct two measures of unseasonal weather based on either a single month averages or
on a 3-month running averages. This is due to the fact that the food and fuel questions in the EFS/FES
record expenditure over di￿erent time horizons. As a result, we compute a one-month average for use in
7 The e￿ect of this transfer on fuel spending is studied in Beatty, Blow, Crossley and O’Dea (2011).
8 http://www.meto￿ce.gov.uk/climate/uk/datasets/index.html4 Results 9
analyzing food expenditure and a three-month average for use in analyzing fuel expenditure.
Finally, we regress the logarithm of fuel expenditures on temperature shocks and other conditioning
variables, and similarly for log food expenditures. The additional contols we condition on are: month, region,
a quadratic time trend, household size, dummies for tenure status (rented, owned and council housing) and
the log of the number of rooms in the home. To model shocks, we construct four di￿erent dummy-variable
indicators of abnormal temperatures in a given month or 3-month period:
1. More than two standard deviations colder than expected
2. Between one and two standard deviations colder than expected
3. Between one and two standard deviations warmer than expected
4. More than two standard deviations warmer than expected.
Given that we work with logarithms of expenditure, 100 times the resulting coe￿cient estimates analyses
can be interpreted as percentage changes in expenditure on food or fuel associated with a shock of a given
size. We cluster standard errors on our regression coe￿cients at the region level to account for the possibility
of correlation within given climatic regions.
4 Results
4.1 Fuel Spending by Older Households
Food and fuel are necessities: as total expenditure increases, the share of expenditure spent on these goods
declines. Table 1 shows (using our four most recent years of data) that the average fuel budget share declines
from 11% of total household expenditure for households in the lowest quartile to 3.3% for households in
the highest quartile. Similarly, the average food budget share declines from 25% of expenditure to 9% of
expenditure. Within each expenditure quartile, the table also shows the budget share at the 90th percentile
(that is, where 10% of households have a budget share equal to or larger than this value). It is important
to note that, in the lowest expenditure quartile, 10% of households spend more than 20% of their budget
on fuel9 and 41% on food. For those households interviewed during the winter, average budget shares were
marginally (1-2%) larger.
Figure 1 shows that these shares have declined over time. Fuel shares have broadly declined since 1986,
reaching a low in 2004, but have increased most recently. Food shares have broadly declined over the same
period.
9 Note that according to Department for Environment, Food and Rural A￿airs (2004), ￿A household is in fuel poverty if, in
order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime it would be required to spend more than 10% of its income (including Housing4 Results 10
Tab. 1: Fuel & Food Shares, 2004-2007 (Households With At Least One Member Over 60 Years of Age)
Fuel
Expenditure Quartile 1 2 3 4
Mean Budget Share 0.11 0.068 0.049 0.033
90th Percentile 0.20 0.11 0.082 0.059
Food
Expenditure Quartile 1 2 3 4
Mean Budget Share 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.09
90th Percentile 0.41 0.27 0.22 0.16
Sample Size 2536 2219 2019 1966
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Fuel and Food Budget Shares4 Results 11
Tab. 2: Fuel Payment Methods, 2004-2007
Expenditure Quartile 1 2 3 4
Pay as you go (Slot Meter) 0.28 0.15 0.08 0.03
Retrospective Payment 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.37
Equal Installment Plan 0.34 0.49 0.58 0.59
Other 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 2 reports how households pay for heating. For each quartile of the expenditure distribution, we
report the share of households paying for heating by di￿erent methods of payment. Paying in advance for
heating (￿pay as you go￿: using a slot or a card meter) is most prevalent among households in the lowest
expenditure quartile, 28%, and lowest in the highest quartiles, 3%. The proportion paying retrospectively on
account is broadly constant across income quartiles at between 33% and 37%. Finally paying on installment,
which involves making roughly constant installment payments over the course of a year, increases from 34%
of households in the lowest expenditure quartile to 59% in the highest expenditure quartile.
Figure 2 shows the change in payment methods over the period 1977-2007. Methods of payment have
changed a great deal over this time period. The share of households smoothing fuel payments on an equal
installment plan has increased from 15% in 1977 to roughly half of all households in more recent survey
years. The share of households paying retrospectively on account has declined steadily from 81% in 1977 to
36% in 2007. Figure 2 also shows recent growth in the share of households paying for heating using ￿pay as
you go￿ methods, from 2% in 1977 to 14% in 2007.
4.2 Temperature Shocks
Figure 3 and Table 3 summarize our measures of unseasonal weather. We present histograms of one-month
temperature shocks and three-month temperature shocks over a full year and over winter months only, with
a reference normal distribution superimposed.
Table 3 shows that one in forty months is more than 1.99 C colder than average and one in forty three
month intervals is more than 2.09 C colder than usual. Cold weather shocks in winter are slightly larger
with one in forty winter months more than 2.17 C colder than usual and one in forty three-month intervals
more than 2.03 degrees colder than usual.
From these estimated temperature shocks we construct our indicator variables for months (or three month
periods) that are between one and two standard deviations colder and warmer than expected two or more
standard deviations colder or warmer than expected. Estimated temperature shocks are roughly normally
distributed (as can be seen in Figure 3). This implies that temperatures are two or more standard deviations
Bene￿t or Income Support for Mortgage Interest) on all household fuel use.￿4 Results 12
Fig. 2: Methods of Payment 1977-2007
Tab. 3: Temperature Shocks in the UK
Percentile Full Year Winter Only
1 Month Shock 3 Month Shock 1 Month Shock 3 Month Shock
2.5 -1.99 -2.09 -2.17 -2.03
5 -1.59 -1.72 -1.82 -1.71
10 -1.26 -1.22 -1.28 -1.34
25 -0.62 -0.62 -0.56 -0.70
50 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.04
75 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.68
90 1.27 1.2 1.16 1.30
95 1.60 1.62 1.56 1.61
97.5 1.89 1.94 1.84 1.804 Results 13
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colder than expected approximately one month in forty. Of course temperatures are also two or more
standard deviations warmer than expected approximately one month in forty. Similarly, temperatures are
between one and two standard deviations colder than expected almost one month in seven, as a temperatures
between one and two standard deviations warmer than expected.
Figure 4 provides information on when and where unseasonably cold months occurred. Each column
represents a region and light grey bars show a 1 to 2 SD cold weather shock and darker bars show a 2 or
greater SD shock. Two things bear noting, ￿rst cold weather shocks occur in all regions of the country and
occur across periods, though less frequently in more recent years. Second, shocks appear broadly correlated
in time; more often than not unusually cold periods occur in several regions simultaneously.
4.3 Spending Responses to Weather Shocks
Tables 4a and 4b summarize the main ￿ndings. These tables display the estimated e￿ects of positive and
negative temperature shocks that are between one and two standard deviations from the mean and two or
more standard deviations on household fuel and food expenditure. As noted above, we consider the e￿ects
on four groups: all households, all households during the winter months, households in the bottom quartile
of the expenditure distribution and households in the bottom quartile of the expenditure distribution during5 Conclusion 15
the winter months.
Households respond to a one to two standard deviation cold shock by increasing spending on fuel. The
increase is between 3.1% and 3.7% over all months and between 6.6% and 6.8% in response to a winter cold
shock between one and two standard deviations. These e￿ects are statistically signi￿cant at all conventional
levels. Magnitudes are also similar between all households and households in the lowest income quartile.
Overall, households reduce spending in response to warm weather shocks. Over all months, reductions of
between 1.6% and 1.9% occur in response to a one to two standard deviation shock. These e￿ects are
signi￿cant at the 5% level. When only winter months are considered, reductions of between 9% and 13%
occur in response to a two or more standard deviation warm shock; these e￿ects are signi￿cant at the 1%
and 10% levels respectively.
We ￿nd statistically signi￿cant food spending responses only to a two or more standard deviation cold
weather shock. Over all months and all households a two or more standard deviation cold weather shock
reduces food expenditure by 1.2%, though this e￿ect is not statistically signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
Households in the lowest quartile of the expenditure distribution reduce spending on food by 4.1%, signi￿cant
at the 10% level. Looking only at the winter months, reductions in food expenditures are larger: 2.2% for
all households and 6.8% for the poorest households and these e￿ects are statistically signi￿cant at the 5%
and 1% levels respectively. Note that one explanation for these ￿ndings is that households simply run down
stores during periods of cold weather. However, we ￿nd that reductions in food expenditures occur in all
major food categories (bakery and cereals, meats, dairy, fruits and vegetables), which include both storable
and perishable commodities.10
5 Conclusion
A cold weather shock acts as an unexpected negative shock to (disposable) income; households must spend
more than anticipated to keep themselves warm. To observe a ￿heat or eat￿ trade-o￿ the negative income
shock must be su￿ciently large that households cannot avoid reducing food consumption. We ￿nd robust
evidence of the ￿rst part: elderly households respond to unusually cold weather by increasing their fuel
expenditures. Estimates of the increase in fuel spending due to a one standard deviation temperature shock
ranges between 3% and 6.8%. These households also reduce spending on heating in response to unusually
warm weather. Concomitant reductions in food spending are less precisely estimated and appear to occur
only during the most severe cold weather shocks; these occur approximately one month in forty. The
estimated e￿ect is largest for the poorest households during winter months. These households reduce food



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































spending by about 6.8%. Taken together, these results suggest that, at least for the poorest households,
existing social programs may not provide a su￿cient bu￿er.
The extent of the ￿heat or eat￿ trade-o￿ in the UK is limited by a number of factors. First, the UK has
a moderate climate. Temperature shocks in the UK are relatively small; an exceptionally (1/20) cold winter
month is on average 1.8 C below normal. Second, food and fuel budget shares have been shrinking over time.
One of the great empirical regularities of economics is that food budget shares are a decreasing function
of total expenditure (or income). This is clear in Figure 1. As the UK has become wealthier, on average
households are spending smaller fractions of their budget on food and on fuel. With a greater fraction of
the budget spent on other goods and services (and in particular, luxuries) there is more scope to absorb an
increase in heating costs, without reducing food expenditure. Of course, even today, there remain households
of very limited means in the UK.
Finally, the increased use of installment plans for home energy reduces the scope for ￿heat or eat￿ trade-
o￿s. As illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 2, equal installment plans are the most common method of payment
for all households save the poorest. Moreover, the incidence of these plans has been rising over time. Equal
installment plans automatically smooth the increased cost of heating due to unseasonable weather over
several payment periods; an unusually cold stretch will not be immediately re￿ected in households’ fuel
payments. The increasing prevalence of such plans over time has likely reduced the scope for substitution
between heating and eating. Interestingly, we might conjecture that the increase of electronic ￿pay as you
go￿ schemes amongst the poorest households may increase their vulnerability to unseasonable weather. To
investigate this, one would need to deal adequately with the issue that households are not randomly selected
into payment groups, and that this selection has changed over time. We leave this for future research.
In summary, this research ￿nds evidence that the poorest of older households are unable to smooth
spending over the worst temperature shocks. Statistically signi￿cant reductions in food spending are observed
in response to temperatures two or more standard deviations colder than expected (which occur about one
winter month in forty) and reductions in food expenditure are considerably larger in poorer households.
Our evidence also shows that most households in the United Kingdom are able to smooth smaller cold
weather shocks. They increase spending on fuel, without reducing spending on food. Fuel spending increases
in response to negative temperature shocks and declines in response to positive temperature shocks. We
conclude that there is evidence of a trade-o￿ in food vs. fuel spending, amongst the poorest of older
households during the coldest winters in the United Kingdom.5 Conclusion 18
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